Cooperation and efficiency in markets
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we...
Xuất bản năm: | Springer eBooks. |
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Tác giả chính: | |
Tác giả của công ty: | |
Định dạng: | Electronic Resource |
Ngôn ngữ: | English |
Được phát hành: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
c2011.
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Loạt: | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems
649. |
Những chủ đề: | |
Truy cập trực tuyến: | Available for University of the Philippines Diliman via SpringerLink. Click here to access |