Cooperation and efficiency in markets
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we...
| 出版年: | Springer eBooks. |
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| 第一著者: | |
| 団体著者: | |
| フォーマット: | Electronic Resource |
| 言語: | English |
| 出版事項: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
c2011.
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| シリーズ: | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems
649. |
| 主題: | |
| オンライン･アクセス: | Available for University of the Philippines Diliman via SpringerLink. Click here to access |