Cooperation and efficiency in markets
The book deals with collusion between firms on both sides of a market that is immune to deviations by coalitions. We study this issue using an infinitely countably repeated game with discounting of future single period payoffs. A strict strong perfect equilibrium is the main solution concept that we...
Τόπος έκδοσης: | Springer eBooks. |
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Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
Συγγραφή απο Οργανισμό/Αρχή: | |
Μορφή: | Electronic Resource |
Γλώσσα: | English |
Έκδοση: |
Berlin, Heidelberg
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
c2011.
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Σειρά: | Lecture notes in economics and mathematical systems
649. |
Θέματα: | |
Διαθέσιμο Online: | Available for University of the Philippines Diliman via SpringerLink. Click here to access |