The quality distribution of jobs and the structure of wages in search equilibrium
When match formation is costly and wage determination is decentralized, privately optimal investments in job and worker quality diverge from socially efficient outcomes. To explore this issue, I consider search equilibrium environments with endogenous quality distributions for jobs and workers. I sh...
| मुख्य लेखक: | |
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| स्वरूप: | पुस्तक |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
Cambridge
National Bureau of Economic Research
Mass., 2001.
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| श्रृंखला: | NBER working paper series
no. 8434 |
| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | http://www.nber.org/papers/w8434 |