00000cam a22000004i 4500 UP-99796217611525881 Buklod 20230619154520.0 m o j ta 080714s2009 mau rb |001 0|eng d 9780262516631 (pbk. : alk. paper) (iLib)UPD-00239908582 DLC DML rda eng DMLUC B 808.9 T94 2011 Tye, Michael author. Consciousness revisited materialism without phenomenal concepts Michael Tye. First MIT Press paperback edition. Cambridge, Massachusetts MIT Press 2011 xiv, 229 pages 24 cm text rdacontent unmediated rdamedia volume rdacarrier Representation and mind series "A Bradford book." Includes bibliographical references (p. [217]-225) and index. Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal concepts -- My own earlier view on phenomenal concepts -- Are there any phenomenal concepts? -- Phenomenal concepts and burgean intuitions -- Consequences for a priori physicalism -- The admissible contents of visual experience : the existential thesis -- The singular (when filled) thesis -- Kaplanianism -- The multiple contents thesis -- The existential thesis revisited -- Still more on existential contents -- Consciousness, seeing and knowing -- Knowing things and knowing facts -- Nonconceptual content -- Why the phenomenal character of an experience is not one of its nonrepresentational properties -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part I -- Phenomenal character and representational content, part II -- Phenomenal character and our knowledge of it -- Solving the puzzles -- Mary, Mary, how does your knowledge grow? -- The explanatory gap -- The hard problem -- The possibility of zombies -- Change blindness and the refrigerator light illusion -- A closer look at the change blindness hypotheses -- The no-seeum view -- Sperling and the refrigerator light -- Phenomenology and cognitive accessibility -- A further change blindness experiment -- Another brick in the wall -- Privileged access, phenomenal character, and externalism -- The threat to privileged access -- A Burgean thought experiment -- Social externalism for phenomenal character? -- A closer look at privileged access and incorrigibility -- How do I know that I am not a zombie? -- Phenomenal externalism. Consciousness. Phenomenology. Materialism. Book http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/ecip0824/2008030920.html Table of contents only FO UPD DMLS B 808.9 T94 2011 Book