Generalized sharing, membership size and Pareto efficiency in teams Raul V. Fabella.

Generalized sharing, membership size and Pareto efficiency in teams Raul V. Fabella.

We first show that the Generalized Sharing mechanism which is exhaustive, allows a team of identical members voluntarily supplying the observable effort to attain Pareto efficient production under increasing returns provided team size is allowed to vary. We then show that where true effort is imperf...

Celý popis

Podrobná bibliografie
Vydáno v:Theory and Decision 48, 1 (2000).
Hlavní autor: Fabella, Raul V.
Médium: Článek
Jazyk:English
Témata:
Work groups.
Work sharing.
On-line přístup:Available for University of the Philippines - Diliman via Springerlink. Click here to access