00000cmm a22000005i 4500 UP-99796217611037550 Buklod 20250117131527.0 m go j cr cn |||aaaaa 250117s2011 gw ||||go||j| ||||||engdd 9783642195198 (eBook) (iLib)UPD-00209103664 CSt DML rda eng DMLUC HB 171 P65 2011eb Political economy of institutions, democracy and voting edited by Norman Schofield, Gonzalo Caballero. Berlin Heidelberg New York Springer 2011 online resource (ix, 425 pages) text rdacontent computer rdamedia online resource rdacarrier Includes bibliographical references Part I: Institutions Institutions: rules or equilibria? Avner Greif and Christopher Kingston War, wealth and the formation of states Carles Boix, Bruno Codenotti, and Giovanni Resta Why do weak states prefer prohibition to taxation? Desiree A. Disierto and John V.C. Nye Self-enforcing, public-order institutions for contract enforcement: litigation, regulation, and limited government in Venice, 1050-1350 Yadira Gonzalez de Lara Judicial stability during regime change: apex courts in India 1937-1960 Alfred W. Darnell and Sunita Parikh Institutional arrangements matter for both efficiency and distribution: contributions and challenges of the new institutional economics Fernando Toboso Institutional foundations, committee, system and amateur legislators in the governance of the Spanish Congress: An institutional comparative perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain) Gonzalo Caballero Coalition governments and electoral behavior: who is accountable? Ignacio Urquizu-Sancho PART II: Democracy and voting Empirical and formal models of the United States presidential elections in 2000 and 2004 Normal Schofield, Christopher Claassen, Maria Gallego, and Ugur Ozdemir Modelling elections in post-communist regimes: voter perceptions, political leaders and activists Norman Schofield, JeeSeon Jeon, Marina Muskhelishvili, Ugur Ozdemir, and Margit Tavits Electoral institutions and political corruption: ballot structure, electoral formula, and graft Daniel Max Kselman A model of party entry in parliamentary systems with proportional representation Daniel M. Kselman and Joshua A. Tucker Moving in time: legislative party switching as time-contingent choice Carol Mershon and Olga Shvetsova On the distribution of particularistic goods Jon X. Eguia and Antonio Nicolo Vote revelation: empirical content of scoring rules Andrei Gomberg This book presents the latest research  in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory. The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies. --Provided by publisher Electronic reproduction New York Springerlink c2011 Available via World Wide Web through SpringerLink Political science. Economics. Schofield, Norman 1944- editor. Caballero, Gonzalo editor. SpringerLink (Online Service). https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-642-19519-8 Available for the University of the Philippines Diliman via SpringerLink. Click here to access FO UPD DMLR Electronic Resource