00000cab a22000003a 4500 UP-99796217609625026 Buklod 20231007234506.0 m |o d | ta 110121s xx d | ||r ||||| || DENGII eng Wool, A. A note on the fragility of the "Michael" message integrity code. pp. 1459-1462 The IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network standard did not incorporate a cryptographic message integrity code into its wired equivalent privacy (WEP) protocol, and relied upon CRC-32 for message integrity. This was shown to be completely insecure since WEP uses a stream cipher (RC4) for encryption. The latest IEEE 802.11i draft addresses this, and other, weaknesses discovered in WEP. IEEE 802.11i suggests three new modes of operation: two based on the Advanced Encryption Standard cipher and one [temporal key integrity protocol (TKIP)] still based on RC4. The TKIP mode is intended for use on legacy hardware, which is computationally weak. TKIP uses a new, keyed, 64-b, message integrity code called Michael. In this letter, we highlight a weakness in Michael and suggest a simple fix. IEEE 802.11 wireless local area network. Michael message integrity code. Advanced encryption standard cipher. Cryptographic message integrity code. Legacy hardware. Temporal key integrity protocol. Wired equivalent privacy protocol. IEEE Transactions on wireless communications 3, 5 (2004). FO UPD DENG-II Article