Auction design in day-ahead electricity markets.

Auction design in day-ahead electricity markets.

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Competition in day-ahead electricity markets has been established through auctions where generators and loads bid prices and quantities. Different approaches have been discussed regarding the market auction design. Multi-round auctions, despite its implementation complexity, allow market participant...

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Bibliografiske detaljer
Udgivet i:IEEE Transactions on power systems 16, 1 (2001).
Hovedforfatter: Contreras, J.
Format: Article
Sprog:English
Fag:
Spanish single-round auction.
Auction design.
Average daily price.
Consumer surplus.
Day-ahead electricity markets.
Economic constraints.
Economic efficiency indicators.
Generator bids.
Generator surplus.
Hourly market prices.
Multi-round auctions.
Noniterative single-round auctions.
Operational constraints.
Power market auction.
Price/demand correlation.
Social welfare.
Stopping rules.