Auction design in day-ahead electricity markets.

Competition in day-ahead electricity markets has been established through auctions where generators and loads bid prices and quantities. Different approaches have been discussed regarding the market auction design. Multi-round auctions, despite its implementation complexity, allow market participant...

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Библиографические подробности
Опубликовано в::	IEEE Transactions on power systems 16, 1 (2001).
Главный автор:	Contreras, J.
Формат:	Статья
Язык:	English
Предметы:	Spanish single-round auction. Auction design. Average daily price. Consumer surplus. Day-ahead electricity markets. Economic constraints. Economic efficiency indicators. Generator bids. Generator surplus. Hourly market prices. Multi-round auctions. Noniterative single-round auctions. Operational constraints. Power market auction. Price/demand correlation. Social welfare. Stopping rules.