Auction design in day-ahead electricity markets.

Auction design in day-ahead electricity markets.

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Competition in day-ahead electricity markets has been established through auctions where generators and loads bid prices and quantities. Different approaches have been discussed regarding the market auction design. Multi-round auctions, despite its implementation complexity, allow market participant...

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Détails bibliographiques
Publié dans:IEEE Transactions on power systems 16, 3 (2001).
Auteur principal: Contreras, J.
Format: Article
Langue:English
Sujets:
Auction design.
Average daily price.
Competition.
Consumer surplus.
Day-ahead electricity markets.
Economic efficiency indicators.
Generator bids.
Generator surplus.
Hourly market prices.
Market participants.
Market simulator.
Multi-round auctions.
Price bidding.
Price/demand correlation.
Quantities bidding.
Social welfare.