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   <subfield code="a">Fabella, Raul V.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">State capacity, stakeholder buy-in, and collective action problems</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">the budget allocation case</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">Raul V. Fabella.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">[Quezon City]</subfield>
   <subfield code="b">School of Economics, University of the Philippines</subfield>
   <subfield code="c">2013.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">pages 26-36</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Title was 'Philippine Review of Business and Economics' until 1979. Title changed to 'Philippine Review of Economics and Business' from 1980-2000, and again changed to 'Philippine Review of Economics' since 2001.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Includes bibliographical references (pages 35-36)</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">We formulate a stakeholder buy-in game where two players (regions) must unanimously approve a lumpy infrastructure program in which one region first gets the total budget in period one to finance a lumpy and productive project and the other region gets all the budget generated in period two. The program involves the state undertaking several tax-and transfer steps in the implementation phase. Both would be better off if the program succeeds. But weak capacity is reflected in the probability that the state fails to deliver at each step. If either player rejects the program, the default allocation is 'divide-by- N', where each player gets an Nth part of the given budget, which can finance only small and less productive projects. When state capacity exceeds a certain threshold, unanimous approval is a unique evolutionarily stable strategy. If not, the 'divide-by-N' rule dominates. A higher return on lumpy projects reduces the hurdle probability and improves the likelihood of stakeholder buy-in. A higher degree of myopia among the players has the opposite effect.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="t">The Philippine Review of Economics</subfield>
   <subfield code="g">Vol. 50, no. 2 (December 2013). p. 26-36.</subfield>
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   <subfield code="a">Request full-text access via UPB University Library through</subfield>
   <subfield code="u">https://forms.gle/KZjBv7aRtY6jiL5E9</subfield>
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