Optimal cash-in-advance contracts under weak third-party enforcement
We explores the implications of North's weak third-party enforcement (TPE) on the structure of the ex ante incentives-compatible contracts that require an advance payment by the principal to the agent. This generates appropriable quasi-rent, which the agent can appropriate. To deal with this, w...
| में प्रकाशित: | The Philippine Review of Economics Vol. 46, no. 1 (June 2009), p. 87-102. |
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| मुख्य लेखक: | |
| स्वरूप: | Analytics |
| भाषा: | English |
| प्रकाशित: |
[Quezon City]
School of Economics, University of the Philippines
2009.
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| विषय: | |
| ऑनलाइन पहुंच: | https://forms.gle/KZjBv7aRtY6jiL5E9 |