Public debt and the threat of secession

This paper establishes a model of public debt as a strategic instrument in preventing secession. Using a dynamic game with perfect information, it shows that debt can be used to pre-empt a country’s separation if the seceding region’s potential gain from independence is strictly decreasing in debt....

Πλήρης περιγραφή

Λεπτομέρειες βιβλιογραφικής εγγραφής
Τόπος έκδοσης:Philippine Review of Economics Vol. LVI, no. 1 & 2 (Jun. 2019 - Dec. 2019), 236-256
Κύριος συγγραφέας: Molato-Gayares, Rhea M.
Resource Type: Άρθρο
Γλώσσα:English
Έκδοση: 2019
Θέματα:

School of Economics

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